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UNORTHODOX OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
IN EAST ASIA 
by Lai~iang Sun 
Introduction 
This study examines the nature of the unorthodox ownership and governance 
structures which are emerging among firms and the way these structures are 
supporting the remarkable economic growth in the transition economies of East Asia, 
as represented in particular by China and Vietnam. These economies are embarked 
on a distinctive process of property rights reform that resists widespread privatization 
in favour of evolutionary transformation . 
Following a brief description of the 'ownership puzzle' in transition economies, 
the study provides a general framework for understanding property rights reform in 
the transition economies of East Asia. This covers issues such as the evolutionary 
perspective of organizations and property rights as a bundle of rights. Section 3 
examines the reform of property rights in the state-owned enterprise (SOE) sector in 
China, Vietnam and Laos and evaluates the impact of the reform on the performance 
of SOEs. Section 4 describes the features of the ownership and governance structures 
of township and village enterprises (TVEs) in China and analyses the importance of 
these features for liability and incentives. Section 5 examines the ambiguities of 
property rights arrangements among private enterprises in these economies and 
outlines the comparative benefits and costs. Section 6 presents a summary of the 
features of heterodox ownership and governance structures and then explores the 
distinction between 'ownership of the asset' and 'ownership of the firm' and the 
perspective of thinking the latter as 'state-contingent ownership'. 
1. Ownership puzzle in the transition economies 
I. I The puzzle of post-privatization ownership structure 
The privatization approach was one of the earliest consensus views on the post-
communist transition and has been a central feature of the transition in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union . This common sense view is believed in 
theoretical terms to possess the self-evidence that comes from orthodox property 
rights theory. The existence of well-defined private property rights is a basic 
precondition for the proper functioning of a market economy. As a corollary, the 
creation of clear and legally enforceable private property rights for firms is seen as 
the only way to remedy the problems associated with the soft-budget constraint and 
bureaucratic bargaining prevailing in the state-owned sector. The most compelling 
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practical reason for the privatization of SOEs is the long-lasting inefficiency of SOEs 
as a whole. By creating property owners, privatization is thus perceived as the most 
direct avenue for unlocking gains in economic efficiency by the placement of 
property under the exclusive control of private owners who are seen to be liable for 
the consequences of bad decisions, but entitled to the rewards of goods ones and 
willing to offer greater motivation for both managers and workers. 
After seven years of great sacrifice along with the transition, it is now widely 
acknowledged that the privatization process has turned out to be much more difficult 
and costly than expected . Furthermore, the key outcome, the post-privatization 
ownership structure, has also become quite complicated and is far from having 
developed clear and legally enforceable private property rights. On the one hand, the 
privatization of former SOEs has led to a complex ownership structure involving 
banks, investment funds , other enterprises, state asset management agencies, and 
local governments in a network of cross-ownership . The resultant governance 
structure is characterized by insider control, representing a general strengthening of 
the managerial classes in nearly all these post-communist countries. On the other 
hand , many of the emerging private firms are turning to the state for all kinds of 
financial 'rents'. Subsidies, tariff protection, legal monopolies , and redistributional 
regulations are still prevailing even where direct state ownership has become rare 
(cf. , e.g. Brada 1996, Frydman et al. 1996, Stark 1996) . Together, these indicate that 
the way to engineer post-privatization ownership and governance structures and the 
way to modify incentives so as to make corporate actors look to the benefits of 
enhanced economic efficiency rather than to the rent they can extract from the state 
remain a great challenge during the transition in these post-communist countries. 
1.2 Induced property rights reform in East Asia 
Property rights reform in East Asia contrasts markedly with the privatization 
approach widespread in Eastern Europe and Russia. Although it has been officially 
stated that the industrial reform in East Asia involves management reform but not 
reform in ownership, there is much evidence demonstrating that the clarification and 
reassignment of various property rights among different levels of governments, 
between government and enterprise, and among parties within the enterprises have 
progressed in a piecemeal , incremental and induced fashion. 
While reformers at the national level have established the broad parameters of 
enterprise reform, the actual outcomes have to a great extent been determined by the 
competition specific to localities and enterprises. Within an increasingly competitive 
environment, poor performance gives rise to pressure for reform and reform 
improves performance. Low or declining profits lead directly to low or declining 
bonuses and welfare incomes, poor reputations, and so forth and thus motivate 
enterprise managers and employees to seek more autonomy and greater control over 
profits. Among local governments , particularly those at lower levels with fewer 
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enterprises under their jurisdiction, the erosion of enterprise profits, the major source 
of local revenues, results in immediate fiscal distress. This distress not only 
destabilizes the distribution of fiscal revenues among regions and administrative 
levels, but also reduces the bonuses and benefits and hurts the reputations of local 
officials and thus supplies a strong incentive for local governments to push enterprise 
reform beyond even the limits set by the central government. An additional 
contribution of competition - one which has not been well recognized - is the fact 
that competition has been gradually exhausting the monopoly profits of most state-
owned industries, the traditional, primary source of fiscal revenues, and has thus 
been forcing both central and local governments to reform SOEs, support the 
development of TVEs and encourage the establishment of other types of enterprises 
so as to generate more revenue and create more employment. 
In contrast to the unprecedented fall in output, employment and incomes 
following the transition in Eastern Europe and Russia, the SOE sector in the East 
Asian transition economies has done well relative to international standards, although 
it is still suffering financial troubles. In China, the real output of industrial SOEs 
grew by 7 .8 per cent per year from 1978 to 1995 despite increasing competition (SSB 
1996, p . 403). The share of medium and large SOEs (over 500 employees) in total 
industrial output remained approximately constant (about 41 per cent) between 1978 
and 1994, accompanying with an annual growth rate of overall industrial output of 14 
per cent (Naughton 1995, pp. 164-67 and 330-31, SSB 1995, p. 377). 1 Although the 
financial situation of the SOE sector seems worsening along with the growth (Bai, et 
al. 1997). 
In the case of Vietnam, SOEs in the industrial sector maintained their dominant 
role, and their GDP share climbed from 33 per cent in 1989 to 37 per cent in 1994 
and 39 per cent in 1996 (Dodsworth et al. 1996, Table A9, Mallon and Irvin 1997, 
Table 2), 2 although several thousand loss-making SOEs were liquidated, government 
subsidies were eliminated, implicit subsidies through the banking system were 
substantially reduced, and the principle of equal taxation among state and private 
firms was instituted. Given the average GDP growth rate of 7 per cent over this 
period, these aggregate data may be indicative of a remarkable surge in the 
performance of SOEs. 
SOE reform in Laos involved the granting of managerial autonomy to SOEs 
during 1988-90 and the prevalence of fixed-term leasing after 1990. During the first 
period, fiscal subsidies and capital transfers to SOEs were successfully discontinued, 
but the overdue debts accumulated by SOEs to the banking system were substantial. 
Fixed-term leasing, although it did not change the structure of ownership, seemed the 
most practical way to change the governance structure over the medium-term and 
effectively hardened SOE budget constraints and provided much greater incentives to 
SOE management to improve performance (cf. Otani and Pham 1996, World Bank 
l 994a). 
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1.3 TVE miracle and TVE paradox 
The greatest achievement of the Chinese reform may be the emergence of the 
township and village enterprises. Between 1978 and 1995, the TV Es realized a real 
average output growth of 21 per cent per annum. In 1993, the TYE sector exceeded 
the state sector in terms of industrial production and employment generation. It 
produced 44.5 per cent of total industrial output and provided employment to 123 
million people, whereas the state sector yielded 43 per cent of total industrial output 
and employed 109 million people (SSB 1996, pp . 87, 388-89 and 403). The 
emergence of rural entrepreneurs and enterprises has not been experienced in any 
other country on such a large scale and at such a rapid rate. Understanding the 
driving forces behind this spectacular growth is of great importance to international 
companies and investors seeking to do business with China . 
The TVEs seem to possess features that are unparalleled in any organizations in 
the West or in other socialist economies. The residual benefit rights of TVEs are 
mainly enjoyed by local residents via their township or village governments. The 
residual control rights, including the right to appoint and remove managers, are 
typically possessed by community governments. TVEs do not face a soft-budget 
constraint, but the financial liability for each individual TYE in the case of 
insolvency is not clearly defined. Very often, the community governments play a 
decisive role in initiating liquidation and reorganization. This role is similar to the 
main bank's role in a Japanese Keiretsu , but the underlying ownership-control 
structures are quite different. It seems that, as economic entities, the townships and 
villages, rather than individual TVEs, have almost unlimited liability. 
The conceptualization of the nature and experience of TVEs has received much 
attention (cf. Chang and Wang 1994, Lin 1995, Nee 1992, Oi 1992, 1996, Pei 1996, 
Weitzman and Xu 1994). While introducing specific insights to the analysis of the 
issue, each of these alternative perspectives seems still to get bogged down in 
paradoxes. 3 This indicates that there is an urgent need to build up a consistent and 
comprehensive theoretical framework which captures the links between the unique 
ownership and governance structures of the TVEs and their goals, strategies and 
managerial behaviour in an increasingly competitive and internationally oriented 
environment. 
1.4 Ambiguous property rights in the private sector 
The overwhelming majority. of private-owned enterprises in China and Vietnam 
are the small individual or family type enterprises. Instead of directly participating in 
markets on their own, most of these operate in tandem with community authorities, 
such as village governments, which contract with larger corporate organizations to 
produce certain items. 
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Enterprises that expand beyond the family also tend to need support from 
community authorities. This support comes weighted with reciprocal sharing in both 
residual benefit rights and residual control rights. As a result, such firms are far from 
representative of private-ownership as this is commonly understood. Instead, they 
exhibit an ambiguous property rights arrangement that involves sharing between 
private entrepreneurs and community authorities (Li 1996). Although such an 
arrangement relies on the existence of a particular community spirit and a set of 
ambiguous and personalized relationships that may undermine the long-term 
development of these enterprises, it has certainly been mutually beneficial during the 
transition. It permits smooth business transactions among relatively independent 
operators and supplies the sense of security needed for long-term development. It 
creates additional sources of revenue for communities and administrative units and 
greatly facilitates the necessary administrative supervision and tax collection . 
1.5 Adaptive recombination versus immediate replacement 
The above comparison between privatization in Eastern Europe and property 
rights reform in East Asia suggests that, instead of thinking about institutional and 
organizational innovation as immediate replacements for the old ownership regimes, 
a more instructive perspective is to see it as a dynamic transformation process 
involving the disassembly and reassembly of existing institutional configurations. 
Using the concept of Schumpeter, organizational innovation should be thought of as 
the adaptive ' recombination' rendered necessary because of the urgency of finding 
solutions to immediate practical dilemmas (Schumpeter 1934, Nelson and Winter 
1982 , Stark 1994, 1996). Thus, our emphasis should lie on transformational 
processes rather than on fixed outcomes. Our attention should focus on the 
emergence of new elements in combination with competitive and co-operative 
adaptations and rearrangements of existing organizational structures. The old 
institutional forms may be inefficient. However, through innovative recombination 
and the addition of some new elements, they can become productive assets, 
resources, and the basis for credible commitments and co-ordinated actions 
(Williamson 1991, 1994). 
Reflecting upon the transition experience, our thinking about property rights 
needs to depart from the Marxist practice of assuming that an 'owner' is an 
individual or a homogeneous monolithic group (e.g. capitalist-minded shareholders). 
The evolutionary experience of the developed market economies suggests that 
property rights are a bundle of rights which are neither indivisible nor unrestricted 
and that 'property can be productively disintegrated in ways such that different actors 
can legitimately claim rights to different aspects and capacities of the same thing' 
(Stark, 1996, p. 126; Grey, 1980). Based on such a perspective, it becomes easier to 
understand why the transformation of property rights is typically a process of 
renegotiations among a wide array of actors who are seeking to resolve their claims 
over a certain set of property rights. 
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2. Innovative transformation and property rights reform: theoretical 
issues 
2.1 Market transition as a process of innovative adaptation 
In his book What Should Economists Do? James Buchanan ( 1979, p. 29) 
emphasizes that 'a market is not competitive by assumption or by construction,' but 
'becomes competitive, and competitive rules come to be established as institutions 
emerge' to shape behaviour. Such a 'process of becoming' is bound to go far beyond 
any kind of rationalist design or central planning, because the process evolves from 
sequences of economizing behaviour, market-learning institutional evolution , 
technical innovation, and, particularly, a multitude of cumulative and mutually 
reinforcing choices by numerous actors who have diverse interests and constantly 
evaluate alternatives and reconsider their previous views. 
The market economy in the West did not originate by blueprint. Its development 
is characterized by decentralized evolution. The concrete institutions operating in the 
West are rooted in capitalist structures and grow through adaptive evolution. They 
cannot be directly replicated in the East. A key lesson from the failure of centrally 
planned economies - that one cannot organize all economic processes into a grand 
design - may indicate that the attempt to replicate market institutions by following a 
rationalist design is doomed to failure as well. 
The market transition in both Eastern Europe and East Asia is bound to be path 
dependent. The transition is not a simple passage between two equilibrium social 
orders. In Eastern Europe and Russia, the collapse of the communist regime did not 
result in an institutional vacuum. Most of the previously existing organizational forms 
and social ties have persisted. For a decade before 1989, market-like transactions and 
reciprocal relations were also widespread inside the socialist sector and in the 
'second economy ' (Kornai 1980, Laky 1979, Sabel and Stark 1982) . In the 
transition, the existing informal structures and networks have played an important 
role in the struggle of enterprises for survival. The interaction of market-oriented 
structures and the earlier types of organization has favoured and will continue to 
favour the emergence of hybrid forms of organization . 
According to Williamson (1991), between the polar modes of the market and 
hierarchy, hybrid governance structures generally possess their own institutional 
advantages. In transition economies the hybrid mode of governance structures may 
have greater significance, because hybrid forms 'use resources and/or governance 
structures from more than one existing organization' (Borys and Jemison 1989, p . 
235) and thus are capable of reducing uncertainty in interorganizational 
relationships involving bilateral or multilateral dependence and of supplying an 
elastic contract mechanism to facilitate continuity and efficient adaptation. In 
comparison with hybrids in advanced capitalist economies, hybrids in transition 
economies lack a well-specified structure of property rights. Therefore, they also 
lack sufficient autonomy and are faced with rapid changes and institutional 
Laixiang Sun , Unorthodox Ownership and Go1·ernance Structures in East Asia 39 
uncertainty. For this reason, transitional hybrids of superior adaptive capacity are 
bound to be more flexible, informal and open to entrepreneurship. They must rely 
more on such social capital as personal ties and localism rather than on legal 
contracts to provide assurances that the terms of a transaction will be met by both 
parties (Nee 1992, Carroll , et al. 1988). 
2.2. Ownership as a bundle of rights 
Property rights are sanctioned relationships among people or organizations that 
arise from the existence of scarce goods, pertain to their use and are sanctioned by 
norms, customs and laws. An owner of property rights holds the consent of others to 
act in particular ways without interference by the community, provided that these 
actions are not prohibited in the specifications of the rights. This definition of 
property rights is consistent with Roman law, common law, Karl Marx's writings, 
and the new institutional economics (Demsetz 1967, Pejovich 1990, Chap. 4). Within 
the general concept of property rights, the ownership right is the most well-known 
category consisting of a bundle of rights. The core bundle of these rights includes the 
following three elements. 
(i) The right to utilize an asset. This right is also distinguished as the 
' utilization right ' or the 'control right'. It is also a collection of numerous 
specific rights, including management, decision-making and the supervision 
of utilization . There is a widespread division between ownership and control 
in modern corporations and in SOEs. That is , the daily control of the asset is 
delegated by the owners to their agents or professional managers. For this 
reason , a residual control right , usually involving the right to appoint and 
remove managers and other rights beyond the content of contracts, is 
assumed to be the crucial dimension of ownership. Nonetheless, the 
separation of ownership from control is definitely a delegation of selected 
property rights to management. It requires the owner to create a variety of 
incentive schemes to assure that the management team satisfactorily performs 
the control functions . 
(ii) The right to capture benefits from the utilization specified under (i) and the 
responsibility for negative outcomes such as debts and damages. This right is 
typically identified as the 'return right', involving the right to establish rules 
concerning the distribution of earnings. As an alternative to the notion that 
residual control rights should be treated as the crucial dimension of 
ownership, the right to collect residual returns is proposed as the key feature 
of ownership by Milgrom and Robert (1990) and others (e.g . Zou 1992). 
Because of the fact that state socialist economies are commonly recognized as 
' redistributive' , distribution rights may be more relevant to property rights 
reform in the transition economies. 
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In order to clarify further the significance of the right to residual returns in the 
process of property rights reform in East Asia, let us consider the position of 
the insider entity of an SOE under the 'contract responsibility system ' 
accepted by the entity (quanyuan chengbao) . Taking the simplest case, the 
entity pays a fixed amount of taxes and profits to the government in exchange 
for the use of government-owned assets, and keeps the residual. Thus, all the 
employees of the SOE, rather than the principal government, possess the right 
to the residual returns . 
(iii) The right to change the form or substance of the asset and the right to transfer 
all or some of the rights specified above to others at a mutually agreed price or 
as a gift. This aspect of ownership is usually referred to as the 'alienation 
right'. It involves the decision to buy or sell the asset and defines the owner's 
right to effect changes in the value of the specified asset. 
Theoretically, it is evident that an infinite number of configurations of property 
rights are possible. The historical configurations of property rights are, nonetheless , 
created by social actors, shaped by struggles among various interests, and subject to 
changes over time and within different institutional environments. In recent years, the 
problems encountered in the enforcement of property rights are central in the 
literature of contracts, industrial organization and bureaucracies in the West, because 
the ' attenuation' of property rights has become increasingly significant. An 
attenuation of property rights is usually induced by the restrictions imposed by 
government regulations on asset use , on the income flows from the asset and on the 
freedom of an owner to transfer some portion of property rights to others (Campbell 
and Linberg 1990, Walder 1994). 
In contrast to the trend whereby many of the restrictions established by the state 
through legal provisions are attenuating property rights in the West, the process of 
economic reform in the transition economies of East Asia is characterized by the 
downward devolution of property rights in political and administrative hierarchies or 
the reassignment and clarification of property rights among institutions, communities 
and households. Economic reform in East Asia has been dominated by the devolution 
of selected property rights over assets - particularly a large share of utilization rights 
and residual claim rights - from higher to lower levels of government administration 
or from government authorities to enterprises, households and individuals. These 
specific reassignments have significantly altered the incentives for economic 
behaviour, the distributional pattern of subsequent income flows, the structure of 
political power and interests, and thus the ownership and governance structures of 
SOEs (cf. e.g., Lin, et al. 1996, Naughton 1995, Walder 1994, 1995). 
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3. Property rights reform in the SOE sector: processes and consequences 
3 .1 Understanding local government property rights over SO Es in East Asia 
Because the existence of local government property rights over SOEs and the 
substantial downward devolution of financial power over residual revenues have 
played a leading role in the initiation and development of the programmes of property 
rights reform, it would help to introduce the features and functions of local 
government property rights for our understanding of the process of the reassignment 
of selected property rights between SOEs and their supervisory government bodies. 
As argued in Granick (1990, pp. 39-44), the property rights of regional 
governments over SOEs in China have existed at least since the early 1970s. 
However, before reform, monetary income was of lesser importance and thus the 
financial interests of local governments were weak . The ownership rights of local 
governments over their SOEs were exercised through the control over the distribution 
of marginal output at the regional level, the management of SOE operations, the 
material allocation within the constraint of delivery quotas for the central 
government, and the use of depreciation funds. 
The fiscal reform in the 1980s fundamentally altered the situation through the 
devolution of financial property rights from higher to lower levels of government and 
from supervisory government bodies to enterprises. First, instead of governments 
appropriating all profits from their own SOEs automatically, the SOEs were to be 
taxed according to fixed rates. The residual income left to the SOEs served to supply 
spontaneous incentives to managers and workers. Second, from the tax revenue 
collected from their own enterprises, each level of government turned over a 
contractually specified amount to the next higher level of government, while retaining 
the residual. 
This system has given local governments the incentive to exercise financial 
property rights more effectively over the assets they administer. The better the 
financial performance of the local enterprises and the more rapid the economic 
growth of the region, the greater the annual increase in the revenues available to 
government control (cf. Wong 1992, World Bank 1994b, Walder 1995). Such direct 
causality has pushed local governments to initiate experimental reform programmes 
far ahead of the central government (Zhang and Yi 1995) . 
The greater control over residual revenues has been accompanied by more 
expenditure responsibility. Local governments must strain to meet the expenditure 
obligations imposed by the policies of higher level governments. They must take direct 
responsibility for the solution of the large range of social problems arising from 
unemployment, housing shortages, infrastructure deficiencies, growing dissatisfaction 
in the consumption sector, and so on. They must also promote more rapid local 
economic growth so as to enhance their own negotiating position within the hierarchy. 
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Because they have the smallest revenue base and are confronted with the strongest 
pressure from rising living standards and growing competition, township and village 
governments have shown the most motivation to develop TVEs and private 
enterprises (Oi 1996). In turn, as the relevant political restrictions set by the central 
government have become more flexible, county and prefectural governments have 
been the most interested in the restructuring of their own most inefficient small-scale 
SOEs through a great diversity of bold methods, including the establishment of joint 
ventures with foreign investors, the introduction of employee stock ownership plans, 
the sale or lease of SOE assets to management and employees, the sale of SOEs to 
outside investors, liquidation, and equitization (Chinese Youth 1996, pp . 14-20, Gu 
1996) . 
In the case of Vietnam, provincial and local governments historically enjoyed 
considerable economic autonomy from the central government. In pre-colonial days, 
the village was the basic unit of government. Even afterwards, in pre-communist 
days, villages sought to adapt national decrees to their particular needs (Probert and 
Young 1995). Under the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, from 1954 to 1975, the 
efforts to strengthen central control were in fact reversed because of the war in the 
south. Most of the SOEs already established in urban areas were forced to move into 
the mountainous regions. Local self-sufficiency in supply was clearly a critical factor 
for survival. This primacy of self-sufficiency led in turn to the establishment of more 
locally run SOEs. 
The record of economic changes in Vietnam since unification has shown a cyclical 
pattern. The cycle begins with the efforts of the central government to impose central 
planning. An economic crisis follows . Meanwhile, local governments and their SOEs 
start to resist the central planning by 'fence breaking' and expanding market-oriented 
activities. These activities are tolerated by the central government to a certain extent, 
and, as a result, the crisis is overcome. Ironically, the economic recovery may lead to 
new support for the central planning model, as occurred in 1982-83. The readopting 
of this model induces a new economic crisis and, as a consequence, a new round of 
reform (Fforde and Vylder 1996, Probert and Young 1995) . 
In the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 'the local level is a constant objective 
structure of the Lao society' (Kaysone Phomvihane, the secretary-general of the Lao 
Communist Party, cited in Evans 1988, pp.31-32). Laos does not possess a unified 
national economy. Rather, it has a combination of a central economy and local 
economies. In most cases, the governments at each level are organized like sovereign 
governments, since there is no telecommunications between the capital and most 
provincial centres and more than half the road network is impassable in the rainy 
season. The local administration is under the sole authority of the president of the 
local administrative committee. The modern sector, which plays only a marginal role 
in the economy, is likewise extremely fragmented . Each sectoral administration at 
each level of government supervises those SOEs located on its territory and in its 
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sector. As a consequence, the Lao experience indicates that there no scope for 
building socialism in a subsistence economy, and this has finally been admitted by the 
party (cf. Bourdet 1995, Evans 1988, Funck 1993). 
3 .2 T71e reassignment of property rights in the SOE sector 
3.2.1 The case of China 
Prior to the reform , the ownership rights of different levels of government over 
their SOEs were far more extensive than those exercised by the owner of a firm in a 
market economy. The governments exerted direct control over all factors of 
production within the SOE sector. Customers, suppliers, managers, technicians, and 
workers all had only very limited freedom to exercise autonomous choice, because of 
the absence of product and factor markets and legal guarantees. The absence of 
choice in fact precluded the right of production factors to enter into voluntary 
contracts that specified rewards and obligations. If one views this causality from the 
opposite perspective, it can be seen that this absolute ownership implies that the 
creation of product and factor markets and the choice enjoyed by market participants 
would undermine government control and coercion. Markets disperse effective 
ownership and favour voluntary contracts to specify rewards and obligations. This 
means that in the transition economies competitive markets have an additional 
function : to induce and promote property rights reform (Jefferson et al. 1995). 
Three sets of SOE property rights reforms have been successively implemented 
along with ' stop-go' cycles in China . The first two have been characterized by the 
reassignment of selected control rights and claim rights to residual returns, whereas 
the third one has involved the reassignment of alienation rights as well. 
The first reform effort, undertaken between 1979 and 1983, consisted of tentative 
steps towards an expansion of the role of financial incentives through a moderate 
margin of profit retention and towards improved performance through greater 
enterprise autonomy. The SOEs selected for the reform experiments had the right to 
retain a share of profits , enjoyed a relatively higher depreciation rate, and had the 
right to sell any above-plan output. Although the programme as initially proposed 
was only for a small number of SOEs, officials at various levels of government 
quickly saw the benefits of profit retention by their own SOEs. As a result, the 
programme became overextended nationwide (Lin et al. 1996, pp . 138-40, Naughton 
1995, pp. 99-100). 
The second round of SOE property rights reforms was implemented between 
1984 and 1988 and remained in force between 1989 and 1992. It centred on two 
innovations: a dual-track ·pricing system and the enterprise contract responsibility 
system. The dual-track pricing system effectively partitioned SOE inputs and outputs 
into planned and marketed components. Actively responding to this system, most 
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SOEs steadily boosted their marginal sales and purchases on the markets so as to 
catch the benefits arising from market transactions. Under the contract responsibility 
system, SOE managers and employees agreed to fulfil specific obligations. These 
typically involved targets for profits and productivity, as well as other profit-sharing 
rules . The targets were negotiated individually for each enterprise. In return, the 
SOEs obtained greater control over business operations, such as the drafting of 
output plans and prices, the choice of customers and suppliers, the fixing of wage and 
bonus differentials, and decisions on the use and allocation of retained profits and 
depreciation funds (Jefferson et al. 1995). 
The contract responsibility system and dual-track price system had greatly 
enhanced entrepreneurial responses to market-determined supply and demand 
signals. However, because of the rapidly changing environment , profit targets had to 
be renegotiated annually. As a consequence, managers had to be concerned with 
'ratchet' effects, that is, an increase in the coming year's profit targets imposed on 
successful performers. Government entities continued to be involved in the 
determination of every aspect of a firm's compensation schedule. More negatively, in 
order to assure growth in wages and bonuses, SOE managers would boost profits in 
the short-term by cutting depreciation allowances, underreporting operation costs, 
postponing necessary investment, and neglecting asset maintenance (Sun 1992). 
The third round of property rights reform was initiated in 1992, following the 
decisive push for renewed reform by Deng Xiaoping . Since then, the international 
media have paid a great deal of attention to the two new stock exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. The establishment of stock exchanges in a socialist country like China 
does indicate a fundamental change. In terms of property rights reform, however, the 
change is more ideological than practical. The stock exchanges are still considered a 
government experiment. Substantial limitations have been imposed on their 
development. The number of companies listed on the stock markets is tightly 
controlled, and there is no guarantee that all firms satisfying the strict requirements 
can be listed (Sun 1997) . 
The most radical reform was once again initiated by local governments. Faced 
with the renewed impulse for reform, local governments obtained a more flexible 
commitment from the centre to allow experimentation with local firms. Seeing an 
advantage, a number of cities and provinces took the bold, radical step of reassigning 
ownership rights over SOEs selectively or fully. The most impressive reform was 
implemented by cities, particularly county- and prefectural-level cities. County and 
prefectural SOEs have typically been the most inefficient ones. These SOEs are often 
too small to apply economies of scale, but too bureaucratic to be able to exploit their 
small size as TVEs usually can . Finding a way to compensate for the rising losses of 
local SOEs has been the number one headache for most county and prefectural 
governments. The reform measures adopted by local governments have included the 
sale of SO Es to insiders and outside investors, the lease of SOE assets to management 
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and employees, and permission to foreign companies and other non-state institutions 
to take over local SO Es (for details, see Sun 1997). All these measures are still being 
hotly debated among central government officials and the ideological authorities of 
the party. 
It can be anticipated that the final outcome of the debate will not be determined 
by ideology, but by the efficiency and welfare consequences of the reforms. 
Moreover, in contrast to the political environment during the initial stage of the 
implementation of the household responsibility system, which had to be secretly 
undertaken by peasants in Anhui Province in 1978, the majority of the reactions 
during this phase of the reforms have been quite positive. This round of reform has 
shown remarkable efficiency benefits and, at the same time, has not generated any 
substantial social costs such as notable unemployment or temporary cuts in 
production . This is mainly because the local governments have promoted local 
revenue creation , assured social stability and been able to play the leading role in the 
design and implementation of the reform process. The significant efficiency benefits 
and very limited social costs of these reforms mean that property rights reform will 
become widespread in the near future (Sun 1997) . 
It should be pointed out that the third set of property rights reforms has been 
initiated in only a relatively small number of cities which are located in coastal areas. 
The great majority of SOEs still suffer from the unresolved problems accompanying 
the second round of reform. Particularly due to the less favourable structural 
conditions and the greater fi scal dependence on the central government, the pace of 
reform in the vast interior regions has lagged far behind that along the coast (Raiser 
1996). The SOE sector is still characterized by over-heated capital construction, 
excessive production capacity, the insufficient use of facilities, redundant workers, 
outdated technologies, low energy efficiency, high production costs, and poor 
competitiveness. The reform of SOEs in the structurally weaker interior regions of 
the country will continue to be a major dilemma for economic policy makers (cf. 
People's Daily , 2-10 March 1997). 
3.2 .2 171e case of Vietnam 
Similar to the reform process in China, three sets of SOE property rights reforms 
can be identified in Vietnam. The first set of reform was undertaken between 1979 
and 1982 and, in a somewhat altered fashion, between 1982 and 1985 . It was 
characterized by spontaneous 'fence breaking' at the grassroots level. 
By the end of the 1970s material shortages, the threat of widespread famine and 
the near isolation of Vietnam from the outside world had essentially broken down the 
system of state allocations for subsidized inputs and of state procurement of consumer 
goods for rationing. SOEs had to establish horizontal contacts with each other and , . 
more importantly, to participate in free market activities in order to solve the most 
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acute shortages of food, inputs and spare parts. Consequently, SOEs began to swap 
or sell their products on the free market to earn cash so that they could fulfil their 
needs , likewise on the free market. 
These spontaneous steps to maintain and stimulate production received some 
political support during the VI Party Plenum in August 1979. A government decree 
(No. 25-CP) recognized the fence breaking activities and announced the launch of a 
' three-plan' system. SOEs under Plan A were to use the subsidized inputs supplied by 
the state to reach output quotas which were set by the state. The output was also to be 
procured by the state. In return, Plan-A SOEs were permitted to keep 50 per cent of 
their profits. Under Plan B, which could only be initiated if additional inputs were 
required for the production of 'list' goods subject to the state monopoly, permitted 
SOEs to acquire materials from non-state sources. In this case, the share of the 
profits that could be retained by an SOE increased to 60 per cent. Under Plan C , 
SOEs were permitted to produce items not in the state plan, sell them freely at 
negotiated prices and keep 90 per cent of the profit. 
It is widely accepted that the three-plan system contributed to the recovery in state 
industrial output in the early 1980s. Annual industrial growth rate averaged about 9 per 
cent during those years . Nevertheless, the recovery was most clearly marked in areas 
sensitive to market demand and in which domestic raw materials were readily available 
(cf. Fforde and Vylder 1996, pp. 138-39, McCarty 1993, Probert and Young 1995) . 
The second round of reform, undertaken during 1986-1989, focused initially on 
macroeconomic issues such as further price liberalization, the elimination of local 
trade barriers, and the shift away from the heavy-industry-oriented development 
strategy. It was a bold response to the spiralling inflation and other compelling 
economic problems caused by the reassertion of the command-economy model and 
rural collectivization during 1982-85. SOE reform was renewed through two 
principal pieces of legislation issued in 1988. SOEs that were officially included in a 
'new statute ' could make a ' single contribution to the state budget' that took the form 
of taxes rather than planned output quotas. These SOEs were also given greater 
autonomy and were encouraged to establish market-like linkages with other 
enterprises and among different sectors. However, most large SOEs were excluded 
from the reform (Fforde and Vylder 1996, Probert and Young 1995) . 
Along with the substantial marketization, structural readjustment and increasing 
openness to the world market, the market share of SOEs was reduced by a large 
amount , even as government orders continued to fall significantly. The result was a 
two-fold growth in inventories by 1990. At the end of 1989, fully 40 per cent of all 
SOEs were recording heavy losses and only about 20 per cent seemed to be operating 
at a profit (Thanh 1995, Probert and Young 1995). Moreover, the urgency of the SOE 
reform was sharpened by a new external shock, the withdrawal of Soviet aid, which 
in various forms had accounted for about 40 per cent of the government budget. 
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Under such conditions, budgetary considerations alone could force the 
government to cut its fiscal subsidies to the SOEs and to seek to eliminate loss-
making SO Es. Thus, the third set of SOE reforms, initiated in 1989, consisted of cuts 
in budget subsidies for SOEs, the establishment of positive real interest rates, the 
shutdown of hopelessly loss-making SOEs, and the transfer of management and 
financial responsibilities for the SOEs to SOE managers, including full autonomy in 
the setting of prices, the formulation of production plans, and investment decisions. 
This round of reforms led to substantial changes in the SOE sector. Over 2,800 
SOEs were liquidated, and another 3,000 were merged with viable SOEs, so that by 
early 1994, only about 6,500 to 7 ,000 SO Es remained registered with the State 
Planning Commission . The 800,000 layoffs that resulted were mainly absorbed by the 
rapidly developing non-state sector. The economic benefits of these reforms were 
also significant. Budget deficits were substantially reduced . The SOE sector showed 
a strong growth trend and maintained its GDP share despite the remarkable GDP 
growth rates. The profitability of SOEs was improved as well, although soft bank 
credit and protective entry barriers were introduced once again for some SOEs in 
essential industries, and there is still a considerable degree of management weakness 
in the SOEs (cf. Dollar 1994, Irvin 1995, Probert and Young 1995). 
Since the second round of reform, SOEs in Vietnam have benefited greatly from 
foreign investment in the form of joint ventures. Between 1988 and 1994, foreign 
investment may have accounted for a combined total of approximately 10 percentage 
points (one-fifth) of accumulated economic growth . Foreign investment has also 
played an important role in the transfer of technology and in the introduction of 
modern organization and management forms. Owing to their established links with 
policymakers, their preferential access to quotas, land and bank credits, and their 
relatively larger size, SOEs have been a more attractive domestic partner in joint 
ventures (Dodsworth 1996, Mallon and Irvin 1997). Because official statistics record 
the output of these joint ventures as SOE output, the development of SOE joint 
ventures partly explains the relatively strong performance of the SOE sector. 
3.2.3 T71e case of Laos 
By the end of the 1980s, the SOE sector in Laos comprised about 640 enterprises 
and accounted for virtually all of the modern industrial sector. SOEs employed about 
16,000 workers, or around 10 per cent of the non-agricultural labour force . Roughly 
one-third of the SOEs in the modern industrial sector were centrally managed, while 
the rest, which were usually smaller, were managed by provincial and district 
governments. Three-quarters of the SOEs were engaged in manufacturing, and the 
others in construction , electricity and mining (Otani and Pham 1996). 
Before 1990, the SOE reforms in Laos appeared no different than those in 
Vietnam (Rana 1995, Table 2). The emphasis was on the granting of greater 
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managerial autonomy to SOEs. By March 1988, almost full operating autonomy had 
been delegated to SOE management. SOEs were free to determine their production 
mix and production totals, wages and prices, and investment plans. In the meantime, 
subsidies and capital transfers to SOEs had been terminated. Responding to the 
changes, some SOEs strategically transformed their financial obligations into overdue 
debts to the banking system and used their autonomy to raise the cash wages of their 
employees. 
In response to such strategic behaviour and the weak performance of SOEs, a 
privatization programme was implemented in March 1991. By December 1994, 64 of 
the 200 or so centrally managed SOEs existing in 1989 had been privatized. Data 
available on 58 of these privatizations show that 78 per cent of the relevant SOEs 
were leased for fixed terms, 19 per cent were sold outright, and 3 per cent were hire-
purchased (that is, payment in instalments). The average value of the SOEs which 
were leased (about $40,000) was higher than that of the SOEs which were sold 
(around $23,000) or that of the SOEs which were hire-purchased (about $3,000) . At 
the provincial level, the sale of SOEs, rather than leasing, seemed to play a more 
important role. Between 1988 and mid 1993, more than 52 provincially managed 
SOEs were sold, and more than 29 were leased . 
Why did leasing for fixed terms become prevalent in the privatization 
programme? The answer certainly cannot be limited to the government's reluctance 
to do more. Several reasons are listed by Otani and Pham (1996, p . 47). Leasing may 
be more politically acceptable than outright sales because of a concern among the 
public that the nation's property might be entirely sold off. Because of uncertainty 
about the value of SOEs and about the effectiveness of the economic reforms, the 
private sector may prefer the less risky option of leasing. When alternative modes of 
privatization are too costly, contracting out or leasing to employee collectives 
becomes practical. If SOEs are relatively large or require technology that is more 
sophisticated than the technology domestic sources are able to provide, joint ventures 
become more attractive. 
Although fixed-term leasing has benefits over the medium run, it can cause 
problems in the long run. Leasing does not involve the transfer of residual control 
rights , and management structures are shifted only for a limited period . These two 
characteristics represent disincentives for long-term investment and even encourage 
decapitalization because, with an average lease period of 15 years, leaseholders may 
have a limited horizon. From the government perspective, monitoring the leased 
SOEs is difficult and costly. Therefore, refinements in the leases, such as offering to 
lessees who have performed well the priority during future lease negotiations or 
competitions and other more radical reforms will be required. 
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4. Ownership and governance structures of TVEs in China 
In official statistics in China, 'township and village enterprise' (TYE) covers a 
wide range of ownership categories, including collective ownership by township and 
village communities, private ownership by households and groups of households, 
joint ownership by domestic and foreign investors, and joint ownership by domestic 
shareholders (Table 2) . The sector does not include SOEs and enterprises owned by 
urban collectives, although it does include enterprises owned jointly by urban and 
rural enterprises. 
Table I - THE OUTPUT, EMPLOYMENT AND NUMBER OF RURAL ENTERPRISES IN 
CHINA (1994) 
Total Township Village Joint 1 Household 1 
Output Value (billions yuan) 4 ,258 .85 1504 .09 1382 .51 lll.38 476.93 
Share( %) 100.00 35.32 32.46 6.31 27.00 
Employment Numher (millions) 120.18 29.61 29.38 7 .71 46 .78 
Share( %) 100.00 24.64 24.45 7.30 44.00 
Numher Number (thousands) 24,945 423 I ,228 901.8 18,487.2 
Share( %) 100.00 1.70 4 .92 4 .31 88.39 
Sources: SSB (1995), pp. 363-5. Yearbook of China's Township and Village Enterprises (1993). 
Notes: 1 1992 figures. Because of the slight decline of the shares of household and jointly owned firms 
from 1992 to I 994 , the sum of the shares of each component is slightly greater than 100. 
In 1994, enterprises owned by townships and villages account for 49.1 per cent of 
employment in the TYE sector and produce the dominant portion (67 .8 per cent) of 
total output. The individual household-run enterprises account for 44 per cent of 
employment and 27 per cent of output. The shares of jointly owned private 
enterprises in both employment and output are quite small. In the discussion that 
follows, 'TVEs' are understood in the narrower sense of collective ownership only. 
The ownership characteristics of household-run enterprises and other private 
enterprises, as well as the close links between them and TVEs will be analysed in the 
next section . 
The range of activities undertaken by TYEs is much broader than their name 
implies. These activities include all 40 industrial categories appearing in Chinese 
statistics, as well as agriculture, construction, transportation and communications, 
and commerce and services. Some TVEs have reached beyond China to set up joint 
ventures in Eastern Europe, Russia, Southeast Asia, and the US (Wong et al. 1995). 
The shares of one TYE are traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (People's 
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Daily, overseas edition, 16 July 1996, page 5) . The annual growth rate of the exports 
of TV Es has been above 30 per cent since the mid 1980s. Since 1992, TYE exports 
have accounted for over 42 per cent of the national total. TYE exports include 
textiles, garments, arts and crafts, chemicals, machinery, and electronics and 
communications equipment (The Economist, 28 November 1992, Yearbook of 
China's TVEs, various years). TVEs also vary in size. For example, in Jiangsu 
Province in May 1996 there were 1, 172 TVEs with close to or more than 1,000 
employees each. The 329 large TYE groups officially registered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture average 183 million yuan ($22 million) each in total assets, 300 million 
yuan ($36 million) each in annual sales and 32.5 million yuan ($3 .9 million) in 
profits before taxes (Hsingtao 1996, page AS). 
There is an obvious contradiction between the outstanding performance of TVEs 
and the outcome predicted by traditional property rights theory. As pointed out by 
Weitzman and Xu (1994), first, a typical TYE has no owner in the sense of 
traditional property rights theory. Nominally, TVEs are collectively owned by all the 
members of a community, but these collective owners usually do not have clearly 
defined shares. Second, there are no residual control rights in the traditional sense. 
'Owners' must wait passively to enjoy the ownership benefits, which mainly take the 
form of communal social investments. The 'owners' of a TYE do not have full rights 
to use the after-tax income, a majority of which, by law, must be used for 
reinvestment or for social purposes. Third, until recently at least, and in most cases, 
the 'owners' could not sell, inherit or otherwise transfer TYE assets . According to 
traditional property rights theory, TVEs should therefore be relatively inefficient, and 
they should be privatized . 
However, in reality, not only has the growth rate of TYE output been impressive 
in both absolute and relative terms, but the productivity of TVEs has also been 
extraordinary. Although capital-labour ratios among TVEs are only about 25 per cent 
of those in the SOE sector, output-labour ratios among TVEs are about 80 per cent of 
those in the state sector (People's Daily 19 Feb. 1997). Various estimates place the 
annual growth rate of the total factor productivity of TVEs at between 5 per cent and 
12 per cent over more than a decade. This is outstanding relative to world standards 
(cf. World Bank 1996, p. 51, Weitzman and Xu 1994, Jefferson and Rawski 1994, p. 
56, Woo et al. 1994). Likewise, TVEs have exhibited comparative advantages over 
private firms in China, and their average performance seems to be at least as effective 
as that of private enterprises (Nee 1992, Svejnar 1990, Dong and Putterman 1997). 
Why is this so? First , community members do possess the right to derive 
significant short-run and long-run benefits from TYE ownership, if, rather than 
merely short-run financial advantages such as dividends, 'benefits' are understood in 
the larger sense of job opportunities, job security, pension funds, and communal 
welfare programmes in housing, health care, irrigation, road construction, and other 
infrastructure. 4 
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Second, although the residual control rights exercised by a community 
government may imply a certain amount of risk of bureaucratization, the control by 
government over the implementation and co-ordination of internal reorganization or 
over the takeover process does sidestep the social and economic costs of bankruptcy 
through court action or of takeover by outsiders. This control is quite similar to that 
exercised by the main bank in a Japanese Keiretsu. 
Third, because it is a fixed economic entity, the community, unlike a specific 
TYE, can shoulder an almost unlimited liability. Under the pressure of intense 
competition, this ability can facilitate a consensus among community members, the 
community government and TYE management and workers to maximize profits even 
by means of the sacrifice of all or part of wage income. Moreover, because a 
community is diversified in an economic sense, it can diversify the business risk. A 
township or village can rather easily create several small-scale TYEs in 
manufacturing, agriculture, commerce, construction, and transportation and then 
expand the size of these TYEs. 
Fourth, because the community is a small society, the c1t1zenry can fully or 
partially vote by hands in the semi-competitive elections for community officials in 
wealthier villages and in those with large TYE economy (O'Brien 1994, pp. 47 and 
51; The Economist, 2 November 1996, pp . 81-83). The citizens can also participate 
quite directly in discussions with community leaders. These two avenues clearly 
contribute to the solution of the problem of monitoring the monitors and help reduce 
the cost of organization. 
Finally, because the community is the corporation, the responsibility contract and 
subcontract system can be easily arranged between the community representative 
assemblies and the community government, between the government and the TYEs, 
and within the TYEs. These contracts and subcontracts have facilitated the solution of 
monitoring problems within the community and within the TYEs (Lin 1995; O'Brien 
1994, p . 45; Wong et al. 1995) . 
The advantages of the TYE ownership and governance structure are only relative. 
Many serious problems exist that may be linked to this structure. Among them, two 
are often pointed out. First, because township and village governments seem to be 
shifting the responsibility for the overall development of rural communities onto 
TYEs and to exercise unfavourable interference into TYE management, many TYEs 
are now also experiencing redundant employment and increasingly heavy social 
burdens (China Information Daily, 2 August 1993, p. 2). Second, because TYE 
development has been so closely tied to local initiative, rural industrialization has not 
yet been accompanied by urbanization. As a result, many TYEs have already been 
restricted by the lack of infrastructure, market information and social services and by 
poor transportation and communication networks. The existence of such problems 
means that there is a need for further reform in the TYE sector. The reform would be 
more than further clarification in TYE property rights. 
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S. Property rights and private enterprises in East Asia 
The private and household enterprise sector has experienced very dramatic 
growth during the reform years in China and Vietnam. For example, in industry in 
Vietnam the share of private and household enterprises in the total rose from 14.5 per 
cent in 1987 to 23.3 per cent in 1990 and 26.1 per cent in 1993, while in China the 
corresponding share climbed from 1. 8 per cent in 1985 to 5 .4 per cent in 1990 and 
12.9 per cent in 1995. 
Three types of enterprise can be distinguished in the sector: household 
enterprises, rural private enterprises and urban private enterprises. Household 
enterprises make up over 95 per cent of the total. Most of these do piece work for 
SOEs, TVEs and other 'corporate' organizations. This integration of public 
enterprises (SOEs and TVEs) and household 'workshops' on the basis of strict 
contracts has benefited both sides. 
Private enterprises that have grown beyond family-based ent1t1es nearly always 
require local government support in order to obtain raw materials, land, equipment, 
funds, contacts, and access to regional and national markets. This support is typically 
supplied partly in exchange for a share in both residual benefits rights and residual 
control rights. The difference between these private enterprises and the typical 
private enterprise in a capitalist economy was well understood by the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China in the early years of the reform (State 
Bureau of Industrial and Commercial Administration and Theoretical Department of 
Beijing Daily 1984) . 
Table 2 - PRIVATE AND HOUSEHOLD INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS IN VIETNAM 
AND CHINA 
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 
Vietnam 
-Number (units) 
-Private enterprises 490 1,284 959 3,322 25,000 
-Household enterprises 333,337 446.771 452 ,866 
-Share in industrial output ( % ) 14.5 22 .0 26.7 26.l 
China 
-Number ( 1,000s) 3,348 5,553 6,124 6,387 7,971 
-Share in industrial output ( % ) 1.8 3.6 4.8 6.0 8.4 12 .9 
Sources: Vietnam: Dodsworth et al. (1996, p. 45), General Statistics Office ( 1996); China: 
SSB (1991, p. 391; 1995, p. 375; 1996, p. 401) . 
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The rural private enterprises appear more like the wider community enterprises in 
which township and village governments have established informal but effective 
proprietary interests (Young 1994). On the other hand, the ties between the urban 
entrepreneurs who operate private enterprises and the officials staffing state 
administrative, distributive and production entities appear more like patron-client 
relationships (Wank 1996). This arrangement raises two very attractive but quite 
general questions : how might one favour stable expectations for long-term investment 
and the development of private enterprises rather than the uncertainty which can arise 
from the haphazard enforcement of laws and regulations by agents of the state? How 
can social trust and morality be used to facilitate resource allocation , stable 
expectations and information flows? While a functioning market economy is 
popularly understood as a system of well-defined property rights and legal structures, 
an understanding of the ways in which social trust can institutionally undergird 
market activity would certainly generate new insights into institutional plurality in 
market economies.5 
In China and Vietnam, the bureaucracy is the dominant integrative structure in the 
social o rder, the social trust embodied in a community or a patron-client relationship 
is not readily transferable by one actor to another community entity or relationship. 
This fact enhances the likelihood of ongoing future co-operation and an orientation 
towards mutual benefit. As a consequence, social trust in this form , like property 
rights, is productive. It enables actors to calculate risks and likely returns, encourages 
business activity by creating the reasonable expectation that others involved in the 
relationship will behave in a fairly predictable way, and tends to foster much more 
business activity than alternative forms, including the absence of this type of social 
trust. 
Thi s social trust links entrepreneurs with the overarching bureaucratic structure. 
The connection cannot be viewed simply as a localized exchange of commercial 
wealth for bureaucratic power. Its contribution to productivity and marketization may 
be much more significant. From the perspective of private entrepreneurs, the 
connection provides local stability in an environment characterized by central policy 
instabilities and ideological hostility. At the same time, it offers private entrepreneurs 
institutionalized access to crucial resources such as bank credits, land and key raw 
materials , many of which are directly or indirectly controlled by government. From 
the perspective of local governments and officials, the connection institutionalizes 
new sources of revenue to cope with the increasing expenditure and development 
pressure (Li 1996, Wank 1996, Wong 1995) . 
The major contribution of patron-client ties is stylized as the stimulation of 
competition, support for innovation, the reduction of uncertainty, and the facilitation 
of market linkages (Leff 1964, Wank 1996). This stylized contribution may be more 
suited for the ties between rural private enterprises and community governments. 
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Private entrepreneurs compete against each other for bureaucratic favours that 
are in short supply. The licences and dispensations are usually renewed on an 
annual basis, enabling annual cost adjustments. This assures that in the long run 
only the most productive entities can meet the payment requirements (including 
bribes). Competition takes place among bureaucratic actors because bureaucratic 
resources are generally abundant , inducing better service even reform from below. 
For example, according to the 'individual business family' policy implemented in 
China in the late 1970s, a private firm could not expand its business beyond seven 
employees and beyond the use of vehicle transport. Many local governments 
circumvented this policy by allowing private firms to register as collectives. Without 
such a practice, the significance of private business in job creation , the generation 
of fiscal revenue and the elimination of gaps in supply and demand might not have 
been recognized by the state and the public by 1984 (Liu 1992, Parris 1993 , Wank 
1996) . 
The ties between private entrepreneurs and local government entities and officials 
have reduced the political uncertainties that used to follow political and policy cycles. 
They have thereby encouraged investment and the diversification away from 
speculative trade and towards services and industrial production . Because private 
firms can use these ties to obtain the officially-mediated resources that enhance 
profits and security, they are motivated to develop these ties as new market channels. 
As a consequence, private firms have sometimes helped public units market their 
products, provided production inputs for them and infused capital through public-
private partnerships. They have thus helped public enterprises 'grow out of the plan' 
(Naughton 1995, Probert and Young 1995, Wank 1996) . 
6. Concluding remarks 
This study has illuminated the dynamic processes of SOE property rights reform 
in China, Vietnam and Laos, the comparative advantages of China's TYE ownership , 
governance and liability structures, and the way private enterprises in China and 
Vietnam expand business through social trust because of their participation in 
community enterprises or their patron-client ties with government entities and 
officials. Table 3 summarizes the approach of this study in three panels. Panel 1 
outlines the ownership features of major types of firms in East Asia relative to the 
corresponding features of large Japanese firms (J-firms) and large American 
corporations (A-firms). Panel 2 compares the liability and governance features of 
these firms. Panel 3 presents a brief remark on the performance of these firms 
wherein performance is valued in relative terms only. 
The ownership structure may shape fundamental features of the liability and 
governance structure of a firm. However, it cannot fully determine the liability and 
governance structure. For example, SOEs with management contracts and SOEs with 
leasing contracts show quite similar ownership structures, but the latter have a 
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relatively hard budget constraint and a less serious agency problem than the former, 
and as a consequence the latter usually perform more effectively. 
The relative efficiency of different type of firms seems to be more directly and 
closely linked with the liability and governance structures, in which the hardness of 
the budget constraint, the genuine fear of bankruptcy, the effective monitoring of the 
monitors, and the existence of compatible incentives for management to reduce 
agency problems are key dimensions. Within the same general type of state 
ownership, the management contract system resulted in a performance which was 
better than that of the SOEs directly controlled by government entities. Meanwhile, 
the leasing contract system and joint ventures, particularly with foreign investors, 
have exhibited improved performance. City-run SOEs transformed into full employee 
stock-ownership enterprises have had impressive success in China, and the approach 
may be implemented nationwide, especially among medium-size SOEs in the near 
future. 
The excellent performance of TYEs may be attributed to such factors as the 
compatible interests and incentives among community members, township and 
village governments and TYE management, the almost unlimited liability borne by 
the community as a whole, the intense competitive pressure, and the fact that 
community governments are effectively monitored by community representative 
assemblies and by community members. These liability and governance features of 
TYEs are mainly due to the TYE ownership structure and the marketization of the 
economy. Private enterprises in East Asia show hybrid features of the TYE type and 
of classical private firms. The ownership features of TYEs appear to stand between 
the J-firms and the A-firms. 
For a better understanding of the plurality of ownership arrangements in East Asia 
as well as in the West, one might distinguish between ownership of the firm and 
ownership of the asset. Ownership of the asset is equivalent to the classical concept of 
property rights, including the right to utilize a specified asset, the right to capture 
benefits from the asset, and the alienation right over the asset. Ownership of the firm 
refers to the claim right to residual returns and the residual control right. For 
example, when creditors and shareholders are both the owners of the financial capital 
of a firm, the creditor gets contract-specified benefits (interests) from his capital and 
usually has no residual control right or residual benefits right. Therefore, he cannot 
be identified as one of the owners of the firm. In contrast, a shareholder has a claim 
to residual benefits , possesses a right to residual control, must bear the risks entailed 
in the exercise of these rights, and is generally identified as one of the owners of the 
firm. 
Thus, we can view the firm as a nexus of contracts among various asset owners. 
These asset owners include not only the shareholders and creditors who are owners of 
the financial capital and the workers and managers who are owners of their human 
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capital, but also certain government agents who may own or have monopoly control 
over specific, non-marketable institutional and social capital. The actual allocation of 
residual control rights and rights to residual benefits among these asset owners is 
dependent or contingent on the state rather than unique or deterministic. For 
instance, in a typical capitalist economy, the concrete ownership arrangements for a 
firm may consist of a partnership whereby all the members of the firm share residual 
benefits and residual control rights; it may consist in the hiring of labour by capital 
whereby capitalists exercise the residual control rights and enjoy the residual benefits, 
or it may consist in the employment of capital by labour whereby workers enjoy the 
residual control rights and the residual benefits rights (Blair 1995, Hart 1995) . 
The basic logic behind this state-contingent ownership is the value-maximization 
principle of the firm, according to which the optimal ownership arrangement of the 
firm should match the right to residual benefits with the residual control rights. In 
other words , the risk-makers should be the risk-takers (Milgrom and Robert 1992, 
pp. 291-93). Taking into consideration the monitoring and agency problems which 
exist under conditions of asymmetric information, the allocation of partial or full 
ownership rights in a firm to the most important actors in the development of the firm 
can effectively reduce the cost of monitoring and the problem of moral hazard and 
thus maximize the match between the residual control rights and the right to the 
residual benefits. 
One may conclude that the value-maximization principle will push SOEs with 
management contracts to seek an arrangement involving leasing, joint ventures, 
employee stock ownership, and other hybrid forms of the shareholding company. The 
evolution of TYE ownership and governance structures will continue and will be 
increasingly influenced by international competition . The TYE comparative 
advantages in terms of the match of residual control rights and the residual benefit 
rights will be strengthened in the evolution . The evolution of private enterprise in 
East Asia will also retain unique features and will continue to follow the path of 
mutual benefits , although private enterprises in East Asia may begin to resemble 
private firms in the West. 
Table 3 - THE FEATURES OF HETERODOX OWNERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES VERSUS THE J-FIRM AND THE A-FIRM* r 
°' 
>< ;:;;· 
::l 
SOEs in the Reform (IQ Cll 
" ? 
Management Leasing Employee stock Joint ventures TVE's Private firm J-firm A-firm s: 
contract contract ownership in Asia C5 
:\ g-
Nominal owner All citizens All citizens All employees Citizens & Community Private owner(s) Shareholders Shareholders ~ 
contract members 9 
:§ 
Control right Government Government Shareholder Government TVG Owners & local Workers & Managers "' ~ Assembly & partners government managers ~· 
:::: 
Major beneficiaries Government Government All employees All the three Citizens & Owners & Workers & Shareholders 15.. 
& citizens & citizens parts TVG community managers Cl Cl 
~ 
Alienation right Government Government Employees & Government Citizen Owners & All the three Shareholders & :i c 
government & partners assembly & local "' groups managers 
" 
"' TVG government ~ 
.., 
"' 
Budget constraint Soft Relatively hard Hard Relatively hard Hard for whole Hard Relatively hard Relatively hard 
Q 
~ 
community 
"' 
-
Subject to No Yes Yes Not certain Yes, but not Yes Yes Yes gi 
bankruptcy by court ::: :>.. 
"' ss· 
Who monitors Nobody Nobody Shareholder Not clear Citizen rep. Owners Shareholders Shareholders 
the monitors Assembly assembly 
Agency problem Most serious Less serious Moderate Less serious Moderate Not present Moderate Less serious 
Average performance Poor Good Excellent Very good Excellent Excellent Very good Very good 
(relative efficiency) 
*TVG = township and village government. Vl 
--.J 
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Notes 
1 The GDP share of SOEs in China may be underestimated by a small margin, because 
official statistics count SOE joint ventures and shareholding companies as 'other ownership 
enterprises' even when most of the capital is invested by the SOEs. For example, according to 
the 1995 Industrial Census of China, the output value of SOE share holding companies 
accounted for 8 percent of the total (People's Daily, 19 Feb. 1997) . 
2 In contrast to the classification in official Chinese statistics, SOEs and foreign joint-
venture enterprises in Vietnam are counted as part of the state sector even when most of the 
capital is provided by the private partner. As a result the GDP share of SOEs is certainly 
overstated by a significant margin in the official statistics. On the other hand, the distinction 
between the state and private sectors has become increasingly blurred. For instance, some 700 
nominal 'private ' enterprises, which account for about 60 per cent of all private enterprises, 
are reported to belong to ministries or party organizations (Irvin 1996, Probert and Young 
1995, p. 515). 
3 For a detailed literature survey on this issue, see Sun (1997) . 
4 For a detailed discussion about the characteristics of TYE ownership and governance 
structures based on a broader perspective than the notion of property rights, see, Sun (1997). 
5 The institutional plurality in market economies like Japan and the US has attracted the 
attention of social economists. For instance, because they are considered more easily adaptable 
to vo latile markets, personal contracts are popularly employed in Japan, despite the availability 
of legal contracts and a legal system (Dore 1983) . In the US , for the sake of saving time and 
costs, sales representatives often settle deals with a handshake rather than by contract 
(Macaulay 1963) . 
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